Elliptic Curve Back Door – Computerphile

Elliptic Curve Back Door – Computerphile

Yeah, we talked about elliptic curves And how we can use them as a sort of drop-in replacement for the mathematics in things like diffie-hellman key exchange and the digital signature algorithm and so on. There’s another interesting story that people are asking me to talk about which is the story of the Dual EC-DRGB or the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator, which is a pseudo-random generator for generating random numbers. Most of the time you do programming, you don’t need something that’s truly random, right. If you’re writing a computer game, and you need the AI to act in a kind of unpredictable way, a normal general mathematical random number generator, but just move some bits around and produces numbers between a minimum and a maximum Should be fine For cryptography that is not the case for cryptography What you need to not be able to do is predict anything to do with what it’s going to output it needs to be as Random as you can and of course the problem of computers is they aren’t random? They don’t operate in a random way So if I produce any mathematical function or any logic circuit that produces something that looks random the problem is it isn’t actually random What a normal operating system will do is combine an Actual source of randomness so for example the decay on over radioactive isotope or my mouse clicks which are kind of random Or my typing which is sort of the pace of which is a bit odd? and It’ll combine that actual randomness with something that produces a very long stream of random bits for use by Applications on a machine like these. Oh these are called cryptographic random number generators. We’re not talking about the actual randomness today We’re talking about the generators for generating these random bits but they used all the time if you go onto if you perform a Handshake on the Internet you’re going to be generating a random number used once you’re going to be generating the private part of a Different key exchange and so on so these need to be unpredictable if I can predict your private diffie-hellman key Then I can just get straight in on your conversation That’s not a good thing the way Normally a random number generator like this works is a bit like this so we have some kind of state Which we’ll call s and that’s the current internals for our random number generator, and that is a secret now This is seeded based on real random date so for example the keyboard taps or the hard disk Latency and things like this on a computer now what we do I ask this random number generator to generate some random bits for me, and it passes this state Through a function G. Which is a one-way function like a hash function and this produces some seemingly random bits? Which I can use in my application for something secure now if I ask it to produce G of s again It’s going to be the same thing the hash is always the same So what happens is at this point? We pass s through another function f of s And it comes back down here to be s plus 1 and so the state gets updated. This is in general What a random number generator will do so we seed the random number generator With something actually random and we keep doing that whenever we can, but it doesn’t happen all the time And then we can update the state and we can generate Random bits as required now usually these are different functions But often hash functions of what we use the reason is because it has to be one way What we absolutely want to make sure is that I can’t work out as an attacker what this state is because if I can I? Can predict the next random value you’re going to be that could be your password, but you’re generating on your password manager So I’ve seen this output. This is something you sent in the clear. Let’s say a random number or something I’ve seen it Can I calculate what the state is well no because it to do that I have to reverse this one-way function this hash function So I can’t do it. I’m stuck here That’s the idea now in the early two-thousands the National Institute for Standards and technology’s in the US Published a list of four new random number generators the idea being that these would be adopted by the kind of key players who are actually building these libraries like open SSL so most of these were kind of standard like like I’m Showing you here one of them was based on elliptic curves and was a little bit unusual And so it kind of piqued everyone’s interest and though I say peak devil and suspicion at the time this was called the dual Elliptic curve drbg which I was going to call Julie C from now on otherwise I’m going to get very tongue-tied it works very much like this using elliptic curves just to remind you when we talked about elliptic curves an elliptic curve looks a bit like this and it has a formula of the type Y squared is XQ plus a X plus B The idea is that this can be used to perform a one-way function like our hash if we have a point here P on our curve. We can produce a multiple of P Let’s say here. Which is a P, and if I give you that you can’t tell me? What a was right? That would be solving the elliptic curve discrete log problem very very difficult right That’s all we really need to know about the mathematics for this particular one so we could replace these two one-way Functions with these elliptic curve functions this point addition and kind of get the same kind of structure going and the and the nice thing About it If it worked would be that this is kind of mathematically Provable in some sense because we know how difficult this problem is we don’t know for sure what the difficulty of this hash function is Because no one’s broken it yet right we all fought sha-1 with unbreakable and then what happen All right So how does Julie C work all right? So we have our two random variables on our curve right P? Thank you. It doesn’t matter where they are for this example They just points on the curve, so those each have an X and a y-coordinate We have a state for a random number generator s. That is not a point on the curve It’s just a number so what we do we want to use s to generate some random bits But then we also need to update the state and their state has to remain secret remember So the first thing we do is we calculate s P all right, so we’re moving P around the curve s x right and that gives us our R is Just the x coordinate of this so this is going to be a point on the curve we take the x coordinate and that’s our number now ah It’s sort of an intermediate variable we’re going to use it to generate our random bits, so we calculate our Q and we take the x value so our Q X in some sense and we scrap the first 16 bits of that we take the least significant bits of that from 16 to the end I’m using sort of Python notation. Why not write what sort of size and in bits is that number? They’re going to be approximately 256 bits because they’re modulo upon bits 256 bits and this particular curve now this has been our random number Right so so far so good. We’ve got some random bits out We then use our we pass it through P again, so we say our P. Don’t doesn’t so why and that? Produces our new s but by taking just VX again So what we’ve got is the exact same framework that I showed you at the beginning We’ve got a state. We update the state by moving It around the elliptic curve a bit and taking just the x coordinate But we also can output some bits in principle Which is not a terrible idea for a random number generator except for actually this is much slower than a normal hash based one by about a thousand times right which For you know for someone who really cares about security Maybe they would be able to accept that but in fact actually there are some other bigger problems with this that mean that the thousand times is really the Good part of the deal in SATs in some sense Remember that the whole point of this is that if I get this in the clear? I can’t reverse to find this internal state the reason I can’t do that is because first of all I don’t know what our Q was and even if I did I Can’t go backwards through this to find R. And then go this way right so we can’t reverse that because that is a one-way function Remember just because of the elliptic curve problem if I was an attacker how might I attack this well the first thing is to notice Is for 16 bits it’s not actually very many So I can brute-force through the possible our Q’s quite quickly to to the 16 operations 65,000 operations even on a laptop not going to take very long so I go through and I find all the possible X’s for this random data And only some of them are going to adhere properly To that elliptic curve formula where we can find an actual Y that goes with them. All right? So let’s say we go from 65,000 to 10. We have 10 candidates That’s a real problem, so we found that our Q fat alone Wouldn’t actually be much of a problem So then the question becomes can we reverse this discrete log problem and find our way into this state Which would be a huge issue and the answer is? If these two a random no we can’t do that all right if P And Q are truly random we have to brute force it we have to start with as one doesn’t work ours, too Doesn’t work and how many how many of those are there? 256 bits worth which is not Yeah, it gets a bit more complicated that not all point to valid on the curve and so on but is a lot of them Now what if there was a secret mathematical relationship between would that change anything? What if he was actually equal to some multiple of hue like this now it will be very difficult to prove that Because if we can’t solve that problem we’d have to find that a by brute force ago Or there is a relationship between the two brilliant Right we don’t know but the problem was that when this standard came out It was implied that the NSA were the ones that generated these points And they did not explain how they did it you remember the video on nothing up my sleeve numbers Let’s pick a number at random I don’t know 24, and then did some trick with it you think well that’s great but clearly 24 wasn’t random There’s something up the sleeve. We’re not sure about it. If this is true. If there’s a secret e Which we can multiply by Q to get to P, then? Here’s what happens? We have our Q because we’ve derived it from bith here All right, we can calculate e Our secret e times our cue, it’s associative so it’s actually our times EQ EQ is P so we’ve got R Of P which is this and we’ve calculated the internal state? Right this should be impossible to go backwards from here to get to here. It’s trivial if we know this secretly Right which is kind of worrying? What’s more interesting about this It’s not so much the mathematical backdoor, but could exist it’s wherever it exists. No one knows and What happened when this NIST standard was announced so when it was announced? Cryptographers said well first of all this is not enough bits. You’re cutting off here right. There’s a slight bias in the output We don’t like it. It doesn’t look random enough. That’s a problem. It’s a thousand times slower. That’s a problem All right, this didn’t worry too much about this. They said it’s fine. Why we’re gonna put it in then in 2007 dan sumo and Niels Ferguson from Microsoft did a short talk Explaining that this backdoor could exist you know that should have killed this off straight away But the problem was but it was an agreed standard in this it was starting to be implemented in some of these libraries And that’s deeply concerning. We don’t know whether this exists Hypothetically it could all right But no one can find this e so how can we know but then the Snowden leaks came along? And it looks even more suspicious money was changing hands between the NSA in companies to have them install this as their star For a number generation. That’s deeply suspicious and so The strong opinion should he be consensus of the cryptographic community is that this is indeed a backdoor? someone knows that a but it isn’t me and But we don’t know for sure, but it’s a really interesting issue because There could be a backdoor But they might not now of course when you’re using this you can generate your own P&Q and Then it’s not it hasn’t got a backdoor. Well if you put it in yourself But the interesting thing was in my list standard they said you have to use this P, and Q if you don’t we won’t Give you a fits accreditation for being extra secure which is also suspicious So it’s a really interesting read if you read the history of this People were coming up with problems. They were publishing papers saying that’s not right and They were being ignored and the standard was put through anyway, which is you know very interesting? if I was on stage I Don’t do magic right, but if I was on stage and I said to you let’s pick a number at random I don’t know 24 And then did some trick with it you think well that’s great but clearly 24 wasn’t mathematics to do with lines and the tangent of this curve It’s actually not very complicated the point is of what we’re doing is by multiplying G By both numbers or adding it to itself this point addition. We’re moving around this curve

100 thoughts to “Elliptic Curve Back Door – Computerphile”

  1. ya, our government isn't known for wanting to let people have their privacy, same as our corps. I try not to be paranoid but I will still take the time to learn cyber security so I can implement it myself

  2. Can you guys cover the new deeplearning based face swap thing? After watching your video on generative adversarial networks I'm curious what combination of networks was used to make faceswapping work…

  3. Is this comparable to the potential for a backdoor in the prime256v1 / P-256 / SECP256R1 / [insert alternative name here] elliptic curve? Are the technical details different? Part of me thinks you already did a video on that, actually…

  4. NIST were also the ones tasked with explaining the structural collapse of the World Trade Center buildings for the 9/11 Commission Report.

  5. ok, I clearly missed something about the nature of P and Q.
    if you know e such that P=eQ you have a back door. and the standard P and Q are known.

    why can't you solve e=P/Q

  6. When I was in collage our security teacher could not explain most of the things well. I find these videos very educational and interesting. Thanks for explaining these 😆😆😆

  7. I notice you are writing on the chain paper that was used much for line printers 2 or 3 decades ago. Is this still used today, or did you have tons of the stuff left over from those days? (I remember using those as a music score!)

  8. Great idea: why symbols like the one from the Indian telugu language can break an app on Apple devices. And why this bug happens all the time.

  9. A very important point you forgot, NIST Removed that Algorithm from the list of Random Number Generator back in 21-Apr-2014, so it is not used anymore.

  10. The concept of multiplying a point on the curve by some number to get another point on the curve wasn't fully explained here, and seems incoherent to me. How would one do that?

  11. In other words: if there may or may not be a backdoor, but the NSA is showing an awful lot of interest in the alleyway behind the building, there's probably a backdoor.

  12. Guys, could you consider putting your stuff on Steemit or on DTube? Both services are based on decentralized blockchain Steem. It would be great ot have you there 🙂

  13. So is there a way to ensure that our systems don't use elliptic curve cryptography? Or would that require that everyone we exchange information with also not use it?

  14. Maybe… this was an 'obvious attempt' to divert attention from a genuinely clever backdoor in another security system in the same round of releases.
    'Burying the Bad News' is an old security services trick, after all…

  15. "Here, you must use this key and lock I provide, otherwise we won't agree that your house is safe. By the way we made this key and lock but we promise we didn't make a copy of this key"… right, doesn't sound suspicious at all.

  16. One thing I didn't understand: If there is a recommendation for P and Q, how can it be hard to find their quotient? Why does it even need to be "found"?

  17. The interesting thing would be if say the NSA got gaming vendors to push it on lotteries. Forget the mob running numbers, how about the NSA? At least somebody has the winning numbers.

  18. Can you explain how the symbol in the iPhone works the one where it crashes the messenger and any app that had keyboard use.

  19. I really wanted to keep on watching this video but i can't stand how he replaces all the "th" sounds (like in "the") by "v" sounds …

  20. I have been watching Dr Pounds videos for quite a while now on this channel and I must say I love the way in which he explains things. Please convince this man to also explain other things like political stuff or so! I know he might not be an expert in those fields, but I feel like computer scientists might have a super logical take on things. (And I just love his voice. <3)

  21. Great video, great channel! I don't understand half of the things described(wish I had a bigger interest in mathematics as a kid) but somehow I can follow the principles mentioned. Thanks, and keep posting!

  22. 0:50 "The problem with computers is they aren't random. They don't operate in a random way."
    The problem with MY computer is that is it IS random.
    It does all kinds of stuff I can't predict all the time!

  23. Dr. Pound, could you please do a video on security tokens? I trust your videos to get the details right. Most of the videos on security tokens discuss selling features or legal basis. I’m interested in understanding the mechanics and limitations of the model. Sort of like what you did with these excellent videos on elliptic encryption.

  24. since computers take counters, regular clockspeeds and therefor timedependent states into account it is actually difficult to guarantee absolute randomness for parameters. Of course if a random generator seems to be deterministic in any way (dependent calculation times for specific bit lenghts is enough – timing attacks) it is to be discarded.

  25. Interesting that elliptic curve is also used in bitcoin which many suspect is also a product of No Such Agency (i.e. 1996 white paper)

  26. When I worked at NFR Security, we had a co-worker Jason Wright (immortalized in the Wikipedia page on IPSEC). He was an OpenBSD-associated dev that wrote our ethernet drivers. He was publicly accused of inserting code into OpenBSD to weaken its random number generator on behalf of the FBI. We came in that morning, and he had to make a public statement about how it was a nonsense accusation. All his commits to OpenBSD were given strong scrutiny. I think there were minor bugs found in the commit, but no clear evidence that he managed to break random number generation in OpenBSD.

  27. so the implication is that the back door might have been a deliberate action on the part of NIST to selectively spy on folks?

  28. Well, you were right.
    "In a paper scheduled for release soon, researchers document how they were able to exploit the newly discovered leak to recover an elliptic curve private key from a server running an OpenSSL-powered TLS server. The attack, which was carried out on servers running Intel Skylake and Kaby Lake chips and Ubuntu, worked by sending one logical core a steady stream of instructions and carefully measuring the time it took for them to get executed."

  29. Basically, "If you don't use this, that may have a backdoor, and instead use your own to make it more secure, we'll say you're less secure…" Well that makes sense…

  30. Doesn’t bitcoin use elliptic curve? Does that mean the NSA might be able to calculate everyone’s private keys?

  31. Given that the numbers chosen for the s-boxes in DES were deliberately weak to allow for an easy backdoor, we probably shouldn't trust any more numbers from nist.

    Fool me once, shame on you, fool me twice – shame on me!

  32. "Any one who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin. "

    John Von Neumann

  33. So, always use your own random numbers … I bought some icosaeders , dodecaeders etc. for that.

  34. Excellent video Dr. Pound. You have a great way of explaining things at just the right level of detail. Making notes on 132 column tractor feed paper is just an aded bonus! Keep up the great work.

  35. /me wondered about if other curves such as Curve25519 might have been similarly affected,

    thankfully not AND the bad one's not in use anymore, afaik…

  36. I wouldn't call SHA-1 broken, just not complex enough for people motivated enough to break it.
    Sure there are vulnerabilities which make it easier to find a collision, but it still takes a lot of computing power to do so.
    SHA-256 could also be "broken" if people were motivated enough.

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